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Abstract
We use a sharp discontinuity in the maximum duration of benefit entitlement to identify
the effect of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration and post-unemployment
outcomes (employment stability and re-employment wages). We address dynamic selec-
tion, which may arise even under an initially random assignment to treatment, estimating
a bivariate discrete-time hazard model jointly with a wage equation and correlated unob-
servables. Due to the non-stationarity of job search behavior, we find heterogenous effects
of extended benefit duration on the re-employment hazard and on job match quality. Our
results suggest that the unemployed who find a job close to and after benefit exhaustion
experience less stable employment patterns and receive lower re-employment wages com-
pared to their counterparts who receive extended benefits and exit unemployment at the
same period. These results are found to be significant for men but not for women.
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1 Introduction
One common feature in the design of most Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems in the OECD
countries is the existence of a limited benefit duration. The non-stationarity that arises because
of limited benefit duration implies that individuals with different lengths of benefit entitlement
should have different optimal paths of reservation wage and search effort over time (Mortensen,
1977; Van den Berg, 1990). A number of studies have investigated the effect of potential
benefit duration on the exit rate from unemployment finding that longer benefit duration leads
to prolonged unemployment spells (e.g. Meyer, 1990; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine,
2000 for the US, Roed and Zhang, 2003; Lalive, Van Ours, Zweimu¨ller, 2006; Van Ours and
Vodopivec, 2006; Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007a and 2007b for Europe). Another common
finding of this literature is that limiting unemployment benefit duration tends to introduce a
spike in the exit rate around benefit exhaustion.
The difference in the optimal job search behavior due to differences in the level or the
potential duration of benefits may not only affect the unemployment exit rate but may also
lead to different realized distributions of job match quality (e.g. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976;
Belzil 1992, 1995, 2001; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). For example, unemployed workers who
are approaching benefit expiration may accept jobs of lower quality because they become less
selective. Alternatively, individuals with a given length of unemployment, the same level of
benefits, but a longer period of remaining benefit entitlement may wait for job offers which are
better either in terms of re-employment wages and/or employment stability. Extending benefit
duration may, therefore, have an heterogenous effect on post-unemployment outcomes over the
unemployment duration.
In this paper we investigate the heterogenous effects of extending benefit duration on the
unemployment exit rate and on job match quality. As measures of job match quality we consider
post-unemployment outcomes such as employment stability and re-employment wages. We use
an inflow sample into unemployment for the years 2001 to 2003 based on detailed administrative
records from Germany. The information includes a seven year labor market history and allows
us to observe labor market states of individuals for three years after entering unemployment.
Our identification strategy relies on a sharp discontinuity in the maximum duration of un-
employment benefits in Germany, which increases from 12 to 18 months at the age of 45. This
creates a variation of benefit duration entitlement, which is based on the age at which a worker
enters into unemployment. Comparing individuals who enter into unemployment just below
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the age threshold of 45 with those who become unemployed just above this threshold can be
used to identify the effect of benefit extensions in a regression discontinuity (RD) framework.
The main identification assumption is that the assignment into treatment (being entitled to
extended benefits) is only determined by the age at entering into unemployment and is or-
thogonal to remaining unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, it should be noted that our RD
design identifies a local treatment effect which can be extended to population effects only with
additional assumptions.
Our analysis based on a RD design may suffer from two potential selection issues that might
invalidate our identification strategy. First, manipulation of the treatment status may occur
which is related to skills and factors that are not measured such as motivation or honesty.
We test the frequency of the inflow into unemployment and an extensive set of observable
characteristics of the unemployed around the discontinuity and we find no evidence of selection
on observables. However, selection on unobservables cannot be tested. Second, although the
assignment into treatment at the beginning of the unemployment spell is based on this sharp
discontinuity, there might be selection in the resulting sample of the re-employed based on
observed and unobserved characteristics (Ham and LaLonde, 1996). We address the dynamic
selection by estimating a bivariate discrete-time hazard rate model jointly with wages and
allowing for potentially correlated unobserved heterogeneity.
We find that limited benefit duration is associated with non-stationary search behavior,
which leads to a spike around benefit expiration. Most importantly, due to the non-stationarity
of job search, our results suggest that there exist heterogenous effects of extended benefit
entitlement duration on post-unemployment outcomes. In particular, the unemployed who
receive benefits for 12 months and find a job close to and after benefit exhaustion tend to
experience less stable employment patterns and to receive lower re-employment wages compared
to their counterparts who receive extended benefits and exit unemployment at the same period.
In other words, those with shorter benefit duration accept jobs they would otherwise reject,
while those who receive extended benefits tend to accept jobs that last longer and pay higher
wages. These results are found to be significant for men but not for women.
Previous research on the impact of UI on post-unemployment outcomes has focused on
an homogenous or average effect offering mixed results; some studies find a positive effect
(e.g. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Belzil, 1992, 1995, 2001; Tatsiramos, 2009) while others
find no effect (e.g. Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007a and Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008).
Similar to our empirical approach, Card, Chetty and Weber (2007a) apply a RD design for
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Austria based on the fact that previous employment duration determines the maximum length
of unemployment benefit receipt of laid-off workers. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) apply a
difference in differences approach based on the reduction of potential duration of UI benefits
over time for some groups of unemployed workers in Slovenia. Both studies do not investigate
potential effect heterogeneity with respect to elapsed unemployment duration and do not model
selection into employment based on unobserved heterogeneity. Their findings suggest that
longer potential benefit duration lowers job-finding rates but has no effect on subsequent job
match quality. The contribution of our paper is to consider heterogeneous treatment effects over
the duration of unemployment. This approach extends upon the previous studies that focus on
average effects and enhances our understanding of the impact of unemployment benefits.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework and the
existing empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the institutional background and the data.
Section 4 presents the econometric model and discusses selectivity issues. The results of the
empirical analysis are presented and discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Evidence
Standard search theory predicts that an increase in UI benefit generosity, either in terms of
benefit duration or replacement rates, has a negative impact on the job search activities of
the unemployed increasing their unemployment duration. The value of unemployment depends
on the benefit duration and the benefit level in a non-separable way, which implies that an
increase of the benefit level increases the value of unemployment more if the potential benefit
duration is longer. Unemployed workers exert lower search effort as the opportunity cost of
search is lower and they choose higher reservation wages. Moreover, closer to the time of benefit
exhaustion, the value of unemployment drops since the marginal benefit of search increases and
the reservation wage falls, leading to a higher exit rate out of unemployment (Mortensen, 1977).
This non-stationarity implies that individuals with different lengths of benefit entitlement
should have different optimal paths of reservation wage and search effort over time (Van den
Berg, 1990). Consider the following stylized example of an extended benefit duration on the
unemployment hazard rate. There are two groups of unemployed: a) those with benefit duration
of 12 months (control group) and b) those who receive extended benefits of 18 months (treated
group). These values correspond to the potential benefit durations for the groups we consider
in the empirical analysis. At the beginning of the unemployment spell both groups exhibit
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a constant exit rate from unemployment, which is lower for the treated group because of the
higher value of unemployment as a result of the longer potential benefit duration. As the
control group approaches benefit expiration (month 12), the exit rate is increasing compared to
the treated group and stays constant at a higher level after expiration. Similar to the control
group, the exit rate for the treated group also starts increasing closer to benefit expiration
(month 18) and remains constant and equal to the control group after expiration.1 During the
period between months 12 to 18, the exit rate of the control group is higher because benefits
have been exhausted, while the treated receive benefits until month 18.
Considering the difference in the exit rates between the two groups of unemployed, during
the initial period of unemployment this difference is positive but constant, which reflects the
higher exit rate of the control group. Thereafter, the exit rate difference is increasing and
reaches its maximum at the point of benefit exhaustion for the control group. After month
12 the difference starts decreasing as the exit rate for the treated group increases approaching
benefit expiration, while the one for the control group remains constant. It is important to
note that the difference in the exit rates between the two groups is at its maximum level when
the benefits for the control group expire, while it goes to zero at the time of benefit expiration
for the treated group.2
Numerous studies have investigated the effect of benefit duration on the exit rate from
unemployment both in the U.S. and in Europe. Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990), Card
and Levine (2000) and Addison and Portugal (2008) find for the US a sharp increase in the
exit rate from unemployment before benefits are exhausted. Hunt (1995) for Germany, Winter-
Ebmer (1998), Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimu¨ller (2006) and
Lalive (2008) for Austria find that benefit extensions reduce job finding rates and create a spike
around benefit exhaustion. Roed and Zhang (2003) find for Norway that a marginal increase
in unemployment compensation reduces the unemployment exit rate and also find a sharp
increase prior to benefit exhaustion, which is larger for women than for men. Van Ours and
Vodopivec (2006) for Slovenia find that a reduction of benefit duration increases the transition
out of unemployment and produces a shift of the hazard spike from the old to the new benefit
exhaustion point.3
1In principle, those eligible to longer benefit duration should exhibit a higher exit rate after expiration
because of the entitlement effect. However, the control group will also be eligible for longer benefits in the next
unemployment spell because they will be older than 45 years. Therefore, we do not expect any differences in
the hazard rates after month 18. We discuss the institutional details and the way we define the treated and
control groups in Section 3.1.
2A graphical illustration of this example can be found in Figure B.1 in the Supplementary Appendix.
3For Germany, the evidence of follow-up studies on the effects of institutional changes in the 1980s is rather
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Besides the trade-off between insurance and the incentives to leave unemployment for a
job, the relationship between the length of benefit entitlement and the optimal path of job
search behavior might lead to a positive relationship between insurance and the quality of
jobs obtained. The reason is that closer to benefit expiration and after benefits have expired
workers may become less selective obtaining lower quality jobs. Therefore, the difference in the
optimal job search behavior of individuals with different lengths of benefit entitlement over time
could lead to different realized distributions of job quality. Individuals with a given length of
unemployment, the same level of benefits, but a longer period of remaining benefit entitlement
may wait for job offers which are better in terms of re-employment wages and employment
stability.
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) were the first to consider the effect of UI on post-unemployment
outcomes finding a positive effect of benefits on re-employment wages. Addison and Blackburn
(2000) review the early literature and provide results which suggest a weak effect of UI on
re-employment wages. More recently, Centeno and Novo (2009) exploit a reform of the Por-
tuguese UI system that increased the entitlement period for some age-groups. They also find
that the extension had a small but positive effect on re-employment wages, which is stronger
at the bottom of the pre-unemployment wage distribution.
Another strand of the literature measures the effect of UI generosity on post-unemployment
outcomes with the incidence of unemployment, or the time elapsed between re-employment and
acceptance of a subsequent job, using job matching arguments based on Jovanovic (1979). In
a series of papers, Belzil (1992, 1995, 2001) analyzes unemployment experience and employ-
ment duration in the context of the Canadian UI reform finding a weak positive relationship
between re-employment duration and unemployment benefit generosity. Centeno (2004) stud-
ies the effect of the generosity of U.S. benefit levels and finds that larger UI benefits lead to
longer subsequent employment spells. Tatsiramos (2009) analyzing data from eight European
countries, comparing UI recipients with non-recipients, finds that jobs which are accepted while
the unemployed worker is still insured last longer. In addition, this beneficial effect of unem-
ployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in countries with relatively more
generous benefit systems.
mixed. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) based on administrative data find that firms and older workers make use
of the extended benefit entitlement periods as part of early retirement schemes, but they do not find any impact
on the time spent in unemployment before finding a new job. Schneider and Hujer (1997) based on the SOEP
data also find no significant effect of the reforms on the duration of unemployment whereas Steiner (2001) finds
a negative correlation of receiving unemployment benefits and the probability of leaving unemployment. For a
detailed discussion of the literature on Germany see Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010).
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Card, Chetty and Weber (2007a) apply a RD design and find for Austria that an increase
in benefit entitlement length reduces job-finding rates but does not have any effect on subse-
quent job match quality, measured in wage growth and job duration. Similarly, Van Ours and
Vodopivec (2008) find no effect of benefit duration cuts on the quality of post-unemployment
jobs for Slovenia. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) also do not find evidence for an improved job
match quality for older workers after extensions of the maximum entitlement periods for this
group in Germany in the 1980s. In related work, Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender (2012)
also make use of age discontinuities in the German UI system. Using a larger time span from
1987 to 2004 they focus on differences of the impact of UI generosity over the business cycle
and find no evidence for heterogenous effects.
These empirical studies usually refer to different economies and different states of the busi-
ness cycle. This is one reason why it is difficult to compare the results with each other. More-
over, they do not rely on the same identification conditions. For example, with respect to the
studies analyzing post-unemployment outcomes, Belzil (1992, 1995, 2001), Centeno (2004) and
Tatsiramos (2009) estimate parameters which refer to a more general population, while Card
et al. (2007a), Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008), Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) and Schmieder
et al. (2012) use local identification. In this paper, we also rely on local identification and
estimate the impact of benefit duration for a specific subgroup of unemployed individuals.
The job match quality aspect of UI has been also considered in a number of theoretical
papers. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that the increased utility of unemployment when
receiving UI induces workers to search for higher wages and firms respond by creating high-wage,
high-quality jobs. In their general equilibrium model, an economy with risk-averse workers
requires a positive level of UI to maximize output, while an economy with risk-neutral workers
achieves the highest output without any unemployment insurance. Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999) show that UI can increase job match quality by helping workers to get jobs which
are compatible with their skills and therefore less likely to dissolve. The empirical equilibrium
search model presented by Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), which is based on the assumption of
risk-neutral workers, implies that an increase of the benefit level does not affect unemployment
as long as the benefit level does not exceed the productivity level. Their estimation results
suggest that for their data a moderate increase of the benefit level has no welfare impact.
Van Vuuren, Van den Berg and Ridder (2000) and Lise, Meghir and Robin (2011) consider the
effect of labor market policies on welfare and find that the presence of UI can lead to increased
welfare.
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3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Institutional Background
Germany has undergone some major labor market reforms in the recent years including the
Hartz reforms which consisted of, among other things, a change of the unemployment benefit
and social assistance schemes (see Konle-Seidl, Eichorst and Grienberger-Zingerle, 2010 for a
detailed description of the unemployment insurance system in Germany and its changes over
time). In our empirical analysis we are focussing on an inflow sample of unemployed workers
between 2001 and 2003, a period prior to the Hartz reforms.
Prior to the reforms, Germany had a system of income protection which was based on
three pillars: 1) unemployment benefits, 2) unemployment assistance and 3) social assistance.
Unemployment benefits (UB, Arbeitslosengeld) provide earnings-related income replacement
and are based on an employment record in a reference period (see §127, Social Code III,
Sozialgesetzbuch III ). The replacement rate of UB depends on family status, while the duration
depends on age and previous employment duration. Unemployed persons with at least one child
are entitled to 67% of previous net remuneration and 60% otherwise; individual means or needs
are not taken into account. The exact amount is calculated based on the average gross daily
income within the assessment frame of twelve months from which social security contributions,
income tax and the solidarity surcharge were subtracted to get the average net daily income
which is the basis for the UB claim. The benefits are funded through employer and employee
contributions and administered by the Public Employment Services (PES).
To generate a claim for UB workers had to be employed for at least 12 months in the last
three years (Rahmenfrist) before entering unemployment; workers who have been employed less
than 12 months within the last three years were not entitled for UB, but could receive means-
tested social assistance. The maximum duration of unemployment benefits varied between 6
and 32 months. Depending on age and months worked in the last seven years, there exist
several discontinuities in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits (see Table 1). For
the purpose of our analysis we are focusing on the discontinuity at the age of 45 for which the
maximum benefit duration increases by six months – from 12 to 18 months – given the workers
have been employed for at least 36 months in the last seven years. Other discontinuities also
appear at age 47 and 52 which lead to an increase of the maximum benefit duration by four
months, conditional on previous employment duration of 44 and 52 months, respectively. We
concentrate on the discontinuity at the age of 45 because the additional jumps from 18 to 22
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and 22 to 26 occur at a very late stage in the unemployment spell and it seems reasonable to
expect that the transition rate from unemployment to employment is quite low at this stage
independent of receiving unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance. Finally, there is
another discontinuity at age 57 of six months increase of benefit duration from 26 to 32 months.
We do not consider this discontinuity either because it is very much related to early retirement
(see Tatsiramos, 2010, for an analysis of unemployment and early retirement for older workers).
After the entitlement period of UB had expired unemployed individuals were eligible for prin-
cipally unlimited and means-tested unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe). These
benefits were still earnings-related (57%/53% replacement rate with/without children). In con-
trast to UB, the UA was granted for an unlimited period (as long as individuals were available
for the labor market) and funded through the Federal budget, i.e., by general taxation. Finally,
the social assistance (SA, Sozialhilfe), provided basic income protection on a means-tested and
flat-rate basis for all German inhabitants. This assistance was independent of employment
experience but conditional on not having other resources from earned income, other social ben-
efits or family transfers. This makes clear that the benefits for unemployed individuals do not
drop down to zero once the maximum duration for unemployment benefits is reached.
A worker who enters unemployment and is eligible for unemployment benefits keeps the
entitlement for up to four years. The entitlement expires either after this time period or if a
new entitlement emerges. To generate a new entitlement it is necessary to be employed for at
least 12 months. In case that the worker still had months left from an old UB entitlement, the
new entitlement is added to the old one up to the maximum possible entitlement according to
age. This entitlement rule is important as it reduces the incentive for unemployed workers who
are close to the age threshold to get a short job in order to be entitled for longer benefits.
3.2 Data and Sample
Our data are drawn from the IZA Evaluation Data Set which is an ongoing data collection
process in order to provide a new data source for labor market research. Part of this data set is
a random inflow sample into unemployment in Germany for the years 2001-2007 containing over
855,000 individuals corresponding to 4.7% of the total population of unemployment entrants
(see Caliendo et al., 2010, for details). In this paper we use an inflow sample into unemployment
from the years 2001 to 2003. The data is based on the ‘Integrated Labor Market Biographies’
(ILMB, Integrierte Erwerbs-Biographien) of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB), con-
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taining relevant register data from four sources: employment history, unemployment support
recipience, participation in active labor market programs, and job seeker history. This gives
us access to detailed daily information on employment subject to social security contribution,
including occupational and sectoral information, and the receipt and level of transfer payments
during periods of unemployment, job search, and participation in different programs of active
labor market policy.
Furthermore, a large variety of socio-demographic and qualificational variables is available.
We can use variables such as age, marital status, number of children and nationality (German
or foreigner). A second class of variables refers to the human capital of the individual. The
attributes available are school degree and job qualification. In addition, we can also draw on
an extensive labor market history and career variables including nearly complete seven-year
labor market history, daily earnings from employment, amount of daily unemployment benefits
and previous profession. The employment outcomes of these individuals are observed for three
years after entering unemployment.
Eligibility for unemployment benefits is based on age and previous employment experience.
We restrict our sample to men and women from West Germany who have been employed for
at least 36 months in the last seven years when entering unemployment and have been working
for 12 months in regular employment in the last year prior to entering unemployment. This
ensures that extended benefit duration i) only depends on age and ii) that all individuals are
eligible for 12 and 18 months of benefit entitlement, respectively, since they have generated a
new benefit entitlement (see Section 3.1 for details).
We further restrict our sample for men to be aged between 44 and 46 years which leaves us
with 2,241 male unemployed (see Table 2, first line). For women we choose a slightly larger age
range from 43.5 to 46.5 years which results in 2,776 female unemployed. This wider age range
for women ensures that we have enough observations for both males and females in order to
allow for heterogeneous effects.
We only consider two labor market states in our analysis: unemployment and employment.
The unemployment state includes registered unemployment with or without receiving benefits,
participation in active labor market programs and job-seeking (if not in regular employment
at the same time). Unemployment also includes “out of labor force” because we are interested
in the effect on the time until the next job and not on the time being officially registered as
unemployed. Since we do not have any information about self-employment in the administrative
data, the latter might also include people who became self-employed, which is a relatively small
9
group in Germany. The employment state includes only individuals who exit unemployment and
who are in regular employment, i.e. those who do not fall in one of the mentioned unemployment
categories. Participants in public work programs or individuals receiving wage subsidies are
not treated as regular employed.
Based on these definitions, Table 2 contains the number of transitions between the two
states. For unemployment we report these transitions in monthly intervals up to month 18.
Across gender we observe approximately 25%-27% of the observations as right-censored in
unemployment. That is, these individuals do not leave unemployment within our observation
period of 36 months. Around 35%-42% leave unemployment for a job within the first six
months, while the majority is unemployed for more than six months. Conditional on having
made a transition from unemployment to employment we also see that around 46% of the men
and 58% of the women remain in this state until the end of our observation window.
4 Empirical Approach
The goal of our empirical analysis is to examine the effects of extended benefit duration on
unemployment duration and post-unemployment outcomes, such as the stability or duration
of the subsequent employment spell and re-employment wages. We have outlined in Section
3.1 that the German legislation for unemployment benefits contains sharp discontinuities with
respect to age which we will exploit as a source for identification. With a RD approach we will
be able to measure the effects of the treatment at some threshold, see e.g. Hahn, Todd and
Van der Klaauw (2001) for a discussion of the RD approach.
Our estimations are based on a specific group of unemployed individuals. By conditioning
on individuals with more than 36 months of labor market experience in the last 7 years we
are focusing on a sub-population with a higher labor market attachment, which is potentially
eligible – depending on age – for the maximum benefit duration. Conditional on a large set
of controls, which includes among others detailed past employment history and earnings, our
maintained assumption is that whether an individual receives longer benefit duration is only
a function of age at entering into unemployment and is orthogonal to remaining unobserved
heterogeneity. In this sense, the results from our RD approach are only relevant for this sub-
population – unemployed workers aged around 45 who have worked at least 36 months in the
last 7 years – and cannot be extended to other segments of the population without imposing
the strong assumption of common treatment effects for all unemployed individuals.
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4.1 Econometric Model
The analysis is based on a bivariate discrete-time hazard model for the transition from unem-
ployment to employment and for the transition from employment back to unemployment (for
those who obtain a job). This model is jointly estimated with the wage equation.4 Estimating
a discrete-time hazard model allows us to take into account a number of important aspects.
First, we can easily estimate effect heterogeneity of the treatment depending on the time spent
in unemployment. Second, we can handle the many right-censored observations in our sample
for which we do not observe the end of the unemployment spell and the end of the subsequent
employment spell, respectively, before the end of our observation window. Third, we can allow
for time-varying factors like the local unemployment rate.5
Although the assignment into treatment at the beginning of the unemployment spell is
based on a sharp discontinuity and is therewith assumed to be orthogonal to the error term,
there might be dynamic selection in the resulting sample of the re-employed based on observed
and unobserved characteristics. For a similar argument in the context of experimental data on
training see Ham and LaLonde (1996). In our specification, we control for a broad range of
observable characteristics like education, type of occupation and wage in the last job, which
might be important for the transitions processes. In order to take dynamic selection based on
unobservable characteristics into account, we estimate the bivariate hazard rate model with
potentially correlated unobservables influencing both the duration of unemployment and the
duration of subsequent employment. Additionally, we allow the unobservables to be correlated
with the realized wages.
Following the standard practice in the literature (see, for instance Ham and LaLonde, 1996;
Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Bover, Arellano and Bentolila, 2002, among others), the dis-
crete hazard function is specified as the logistic. The transition rate from unemployment to
4An alternative modeling strategy is to model explicitly benefit receipt as a time-varying monthly indicator,
which is a function of previous employment experience, age and other individual characteristics without any
further sample restriction on previous labor market experience. This equation could be then jointly estimated
with the unemployment and employment transitions and the wage equation allowing for correlated unobserved
heterogeneity. Studies following this approach include Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002) for the effect of
benefit receipt on unemployment duration, and Tatsiramos (2009) which extends this approach to subsequent
employment stability. In these models one can allow for heterogenous treatment effects, for example with
respect to age or elapsed unemployment duration, by interacting corresponding observable characteristics with
the treatment indicator. The difference between this alternative modeling strategy and the papers which rely
on instrumental variables or regression discontinuities is that the latter assume separability between benefit
duration and unobserved heterogeneity.
5Since we observe the duration in the two states on a daily basis, this would principally allow us estimating a
continuous time duration model. However, as in Germany most of the employment spells start at the beginning
of a month (and unemployment spells last until the end of a month), we construct discrete time spell data in
which one month corresponds to one time unit.
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employment λu in period t can be written as:
λu(t) = (1 + exp(−yui(t)))−1,
where
yui(t) = β0u +
k∑
d=2
β1udIuid(tu) +
k∑
d=1
δudIuid(tu)Di + β2uXit
+β3uDi(Agei − Age0) + β4u(1−Di)(Agei − Age0) + ηui. (1)
The effect of duration dependence is modeled in a flexible way by using time dummy vari-
ables denoted as Iuid(tu), which are equal to one when duration in unemployment tu is within
the duration intervals denoted by the subscript d = (2, ..., k). The treatment indicator Di takes
the value of one if the unemployed is above the age of 45 at the time of entering unemployment
and zero otherwise. As we have outlined in Section 2, we expect a higher exit rate out of
unemployment closer to the time of benefit exhaustion. Corresponding to that, we expect the
treatment effect to vary over time spent in unemployment. Therefore, we interact the treatment
indicator Di with time dummy variables denoted as Iuid(tu). The coefficient δud captures the
causal effect of the increase in the maximum benefit duration on the hazard rate from unem-
ployment to employment in the interval d of the unemployment spell with d = (1, ..., k). We
also estimate the more restrictive specification in which we consider only the average effect of
being treated, which is captured by the single coefficient of the treatment indicator Di.
The parameters β3u and β4u capture the effects of the assignment variable age below and
above the threshold on the probability of leaving unemployment for a job. This ensures that δud
does not capture a general age effect but the causal impact of the discontinuity in the benefit
duration. In addition, we control for observable characteristics Xit including time-invariant
individual characteristics like education and previous employment history and the time-varying
local unemployment rate. Finally, ηui describes unobserved heterogeneity influencing the tran-
sition process from unemployment to employment.
Besides the transition process from unemployment to employment a main focus of our
study is on the effect of extended benefit duration on the stability of new employment. The
corresponding transition rate from employment to unemployment λe in period t is given by:
λe(t) = (1 + exp(−yei(t)))−1,
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where
yei(t) = β0e +
k∑
d=2
β11edIeid(te) +
k∑
d=2
β12edIuid(Tui) +
k∑
d=1
δedIuid(Tui)Di
+β2eXit + β3eDi(Agei − Age0) + β4e(1−Di)(Agei − Age0) + ηei. (2)
Similar to the transition process from unemployment to employment the effect of duration
dependence is modeled flexibly by using time dummy variables denoted as Ieit(te), with te
corresponding to the duration in employment. In addition to time in the current spell we
control for duration of the previous unemployment spell Tui by using time dummy variables
denoted as Iuid(Tui). Since we expect that workers might become less selective the closer
they are to benefit expiration and after their benefit entitlement has expired, we additionally
interact the impact of being eligible for 18 months of benefits (Di = 1) with the time interval
in which individuals left the unemployment spell for a job, described by the time dummy
variables Iuid(Tui). The causal effect of extended benefit duration on subsequent job stability
for individuals who left unemployment in interval d is given by δed. The specification for the
employment hazard includes controls for the observable characteristics Xit, for different effects
of age below (β3e) and above (β4e) the threshold, and for unobserved heterogeneity influencing
the transition process from employment to unemployment denoted by ηei.
We implicitly control for the benefit level by including the previous wage as a regressor.
An alternative approach would be to additionally allow for effect heterogeneity with respect
to the benefit level. This would be in line with the sequential job search model, which implies
non-separability between benefit level and benefit duration. However, given our limited sample
size and the focus of the paper on effect heterogeneity with respect to elapsed unemployment
duration, we estimate common effects independent of the benefit level.
For the estimation of the effect of extended benefits on wages we estimate the following
linear regression:
log(wi) = β0w +
k∑
d=2
β12wdIuid(Tui) +
k∑
d=1
δwdIuid(tu)Di + β2wXit
+β3wDi(Agei − Age0) + β4w(1−Di)(Agei − Age0) + ηwi + it (3)
Similar to the transition process from employment to unemployment, we control for duration
of the previous unemployment spell Tui by using time dummy variables. The causal effect of
extended benefit duration on re-employment wages, for individuals who left unemployment in
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interval d, is given by δwd. The specification for wages also includes controls for the observable
characteristics Xit, for the effects of age below (β3w) and above (β4w) the threshold and for
the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on wages, which is denoted by ηwi. For the main
specification we assume that the error term follows a normal normal distribution with it ∼
N(0, σ2). We additionally estimate a more flexible specification assuming a two-dimensional
mixture of normals for the stochastic wage component. In this specification we assume that
it = p11it + (1− p1)2it, with 1it ∼ N(0, σ21) and 2it ∼ N(0, σ22).6
The indicators τu and τe take on the value one if a transition to employment or to un-
employment, respectively, is observed and zero otherwise. The likelihood contribution of an
individual i with an unemployment spell of ju intervals, a subsequent employment spell of je
intervals and an observed wage wi for given unobserved characteristics ηui, ηei and ηwi for the
basic specification is given by
li(ηui, ηei, ηwi) =
ju−1∏
t=1
(1− λu(t|ηui))(1− λu(ju|ηui))(1−τu)λu(ju|ηui)τu
Tui+je−1∏
t=Tui+1
(1− λe(t|ηei))(1− λe(Tui + je|ηei))(1−τe)λe(Tui + je|ηei)τe
1√
2piσ2
e(−
(log(wi)−l̂ogwi)2
2σ2
) (4)
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is defined
as a discrete distribution with the support points denoted by (ηup,ηep,ηwp) and the corresponding
probability mass given by P (ηui = ηup, ηei = ηep, ηwi = ηwp)=pip. Each unobserved factor is
assumed to be time invariant and individual-specific for each state. This flexible specification
allows for free correlations between the different terms of unobserved heterogeneity. In the
estimation we increase the number of support points until the model cannot be improved further
by an additional support point, evaluated on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). The unobserved factors are allowed to be different and correlated across unemployment
and employment spells, and they are assumed to be uncorrelated with observable characteristics
Xit and the treatment indicator Di, whereby the latter assumption is in line with our regression
discontinuity design. The sample likelihood is given by
6Alternatively, one could model the impact of benefit entitlement on reservation wages instead of wages. We
decided to follow the empirical literature and to analyze the impact on realized wages, since this is the more
relevant measure of job quality for both the job-seeker and the policy maker. For example, tax payment and
future unemployment benefits depend on the realized wages.
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L =
n∏
i=1
P∑
p=1
piplip, (5)
where the individual likelihood contribution given the unobserved characteristics ηup, ηep and
ηwp is denoted by lip.
One major concern with respect to the bivariate hazard rate model in the context of single
spell data might be that identification of the correlation based on unobserved characteristics is
mainly driven by the functional form of the model. However, as discussed e.g. by Eberwein,
Ham and LaLonde (1997) and Gaure, Roed and Zhang (2007), this concern is more serious if the
model only includes time-invariant variables. Time-varying variables like the local unemploy-
ment rate, which is included in our specification, provide a more robust source of identification.
In addition, we model both the duration dependence and the unobserved heterogeneity in a
quite flexible way, which ensures that the results are not driven by the pre-specified functional
forms or distributional assumptions with respect to these dimensions.
4.2 Selectivity Issues
One important identification assumption is that the assignment to treatment around the thresh-
old is random. However, rational agents will take the distance remaining before the age of 45
into account when deciding about accumulation of work experience. The incentives to work
longer are higher for individuals who are eligible for 18 instead of 12 months of unemployment
benefits. In our estimations, we compare individuals below and above the age threshold, con-
ditional on having worked for at least 36 months in the last seven years. Due to the different
incentives depending on the distance from the age threshold, this might lead to differences in
types below and above the threshold, i.e. to differences in observed and unobserved character-
istics between treated and non-treated individuals.7 Moreover, firms and workers may alter the
timing of layoffs leading to non-random selection around the threshold in order to qualify for
a more beneficial treatment. It is not possible to test for differences in unobserved character-
istics. However, if there is selection around the threshold, we would expect differences in the
inflow probability with higher inflow probabilities above the threshold, and we would expect
differences in observable characteristics between treated and non-treated individuals. In order
to test for this we i) report the smoothness of individuals characteristics around the threshold
7We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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as suggested by DiNardo and Lee (2004) and ii) apply the density test proposed by McCrary
(2008).
Table 3 contains descriptive characteristics of job losers below and above the threshold. In
order to examine whether there are differences between both groups we perform t-tests on the
quality of means and Kolmogornov-Smirnov-tests of the equality of the distributions of the
relevant variables; p-values for both tests are reported in the Table. We find that individuals
are very similar with respect to (nearly) all of the variables. For men we do not observe any
significant difference in the distribution of the different variables. There is only one slightly
significant difference in the share of individuals with a high school degree. For women we find
some significant mean differences in marital status, number of children below the age of 10,
which can be explained by the fact that individuals below the threshold are on average one
year younger, and school degree. Additionally, the time spent in employment in the years
4-7 before entering unemployment is approximately one month larger for women above the
threshold which makes not only the mean but also the distribution significantly different. These
differences become largely insignificant once we use only women in the age range from 44 to 46
years as we do for men. Comparisons at other ‘artificial’ thresholds which are unrelated to ours
(e.g. at age 41) show similar patterns. This indicates that these significant differences may be
driven by age and not by selection around the threshold.
To explore the selectivity issue in more detail we apply the density test suggested by Mc-
Crary (2008). It is based on an estimator for the discontinuity at the cutoff in the density
function of the running variable. The test is implemented as a Wald test of the null hypothesis
that the discontinuity is zero. It can be seen as an extension of the local linear density estimator
proceeding in two steps. In the first step, one obtains a finely gridded histogram and in the
second step, one smoothes the histogram using local linear regression, separately on either side
of the cutoff. The density test is informative if the manipulation is monotonic, i.e. if agents
adjust the running variable in one direction only which would clearly be the case in our appli-
cation. Figure 1 presents the first-step histogram along with estimation results for the height
difference in the distributions. For men the estimated height difference between the group be-
low and above the age threshold is 0.178 (standard error: 0.120) and not statistically different
from zero. The same holds true for women (difference: -0.030, standard error: 0.105) which
makes us comfortable in arguing that there is no manipulation in the running variable. Both,
the comparison of the observable characteristics and the density test indicate that workers do
not delay the timing of job separation to benefit from a longer entitlement period.
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Before we provide some intuition why this might be the case we make a last validation
exercise and compare the time between the end of the last employment spell and the start
of the unemployment spell below and above the threshold. If there would be any strategic
behavior we would expect people below the threshold to have a longer duration in between
the two spells. We find that on average the time between the end of the employment and the
beginning of the unemployment spell is below three days and there are no systematic differences
in this variable below and above the threshold.8
Looking once again at the institutional setting shows that this finding is not surprising. In
order to avoid benefit sanctions individuals are required to register as a job-seeker with the local
labor office already three months before an employment contract ends (§38, Social Code III).
If the time between the moment they are informed about the termination and the actual end
of the contract is less than three months they have to register within three days. If individuals
do not comply with this rule they can be sanctioned with benefit withdrawal of up to 12 weeks
(§144, Social Code III). Apart from this institutional feature, the probability of benefiting from
the additional six months of benefit duration is quite low at the beginning of the unemployment
spell, because many individuals find a new job within the first 12 months of unemployment.
Therefore, we find convincing evidence that there is no manipulation in the running variable,
which allows us to identify causal effects of the extended benefit duration.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Evidence
We first provide some descriptive evidence on the effect of extended benefit duration based on
the observed unemployment duration for different groups by age of entering unemployment. For
both men and women the average unemployment duration is higher for the treated who enter
unemployment after the age of 45 (with 18 months of potential benefit duration) compared
to their younger counterparts below the age threshold (with 12 months of potential benefit
duration). In addition, there is a slight increase in unemployment duration for the treated as
they get older (see Figure B.3 in the Supplementary Appendix). We also estimate a logit model
for the probability of finding a job within a given interval after entering unemployment. Table 4
reports the results showing that being eligible for six additional months of benefits significantly
8For additional information see Figure B.2 in the Supplementary Appendix which shows the difference along
the age distribution and the relevant test statistics.
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reduces the probability of finding a job within 6, 12 and 18 months, respectively. For example,
the estimates for the job finding probability within 12 months imply that extended benefits are
associated with a reduced probability of around 23% for men and around 34% for women.
Since the impact of a longer benefit entitlement may vary over time spent in unemployment,
it is informative to look at the empirical hazard rates. Figure 2 shows a spike in the probability
of leaving unemployment for a job around month 12, the last month of benefit receipt for the
younger group, which is larger for women. However, the increase in the exit probability is
rather moderate. This might be due to the fact that transfers do not drop to zero once the
receipt of UB expires (see Section 3.1). Especially if the household does not have any other
sources of income, the drop is relatively small compared to other countries like the U.S.
5.2 Specification and Estimation of the Model
We estimate the econometric model described in Section 4.1 for men and women separately
under two different specifications regarding the way we capture the treatment effect. In the
first specification, we include a dummy for being treated which identifies an average effect of
extending benefits on the three outcomes of interest (unemployment transition, employment
transition and re-employment wages) imposing a common effect of the treatment over the
unemployment duration. In the second specification, we relax this restriction by interacting the
treatment dummy with elapsed unemployment duration for the unemployment transition and
with previous unemployment duration for the employment transition and the wage equation.
We specify unemployment duration flexibly by monthly intervals until month 18. For longer
durations we consider group intervals for months 19 to 24, 25 to 30 and 31 to 36 because the cell
size by treatment and control group becomes small. With this specification we can identify the
effect of treatment on the exit rate from unemployment at different lengths of unemployment.
Most importantly, we can also identify the effect of treatment at different lengths of completed
unemployment duration on subsequent job match quality.
The Log-Likelihood of the estimation with unobserved heterogeneity clearly indicates an
improved model-fit compared to the model without unobserved heterogeneity, so we focus the
discussion on these results.9 The preferred specification for the flexible model allowing for het-
erogeneous treatment effects is based on five mass points for males and on three mass points
9For example, the Log-Likelihood significantly increases from −10, 497.43 to −10, 144.66 for men in the
restricted model and from −10, 461.52 to −10, 110.07 in the model including interaction effects of the treatment
dummy with elapsed unemployment duration. The results for the independent transitions without controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity are not reported but they are available from the authors.
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for females. For both men and women, our results indicate that unobserved characteristics in-
fluencing unemployment duration and employment stability are negatively correlated, whereby
this correlation is close to zero for men. Moreover, individuals with unobserved characteris-
tics associated with higher wages tend to have longer employment spells, while the correlation
between unobserved characteristics of the wage equation and the probability of leaving unem-
ployment for a job is positive (see Table A.1 in the Supplementary Appendix). Finally, in the
case of male workers, we find evidence that the error term of the wage equation follows a two
dimensional mixture of normals, while this is not the case for females.
5.3 Homogeneous Treatment Effect
Starting with the homogenous treatment effect the results in Table 5 show that eligibility to ex-
tended unemployment benefits (Treated) has a negative effect on the unemployment transition
for both males and females. We report estimates under different specifications of the discrete
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The average treatment effect of extended benefits is
significant at the 5% level in all specifications for females. The point estimates are quite similar
and they suggest that the probability of finding a job in a given month t is about 26% lower
for those females who are eligible to extended benefits compared to the non-eligible ones. For
males the coefficient of being treated on the unemployment transition remains negative but
loses its significance once we increase the mass points from 4 to 5, which goes along with a
better model fit, evaluated on the basis of the AIC.10
The average effect of extended benefit duration on the employment transition is not sig-
nificantly different from zero for both genders. The finding of no significant average effect of
changes in benefit duration on employment stability is in line with the studies by Card et al.
(2007a) and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008). We also consider the wages received in the sam-
ple of re-employed individuals. If eligibility of additional six months of unemployment benefits
induces unemployed individuals to set higher reservation wages, we may observe higher wages
for the treatment group. Our results show that benefit extension has a positive average effect
on wages of around 3.7% for men, but this effect is not statistically significant. For females,
the point estimate is negative but it is also not statistically different from zero. Centeno and
Novo (2009) find also small or no effect of benefit duration on wages in Portugal.
10The coefficients of the complete model are reported in the Supplementary Appendix in Tables A.2, A.3 and
A.4 for the unemployment duration, the employment transitions and the wage equation, respectively.
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5.4 Time-Varying Treatment Effects
5.4.1 Unemployment Hazard
In Table 6 we present the heterogenous treatment results from the interaction of the treatment
dummy with unemployment duration grouped in intervals. For both males and females we
observe very similar patterns in the exit rate from unemployment. There are three different
effects worth emphasizing which are in line with the discussion in Section 2. First, we find
evidence for differences in the exit rate at the beginning of the unemployment spell between
the two groups. The treated, who receive extended benefits for 18 months, exhibit a lower exit
rate compared to the controls with 12 months of benefit duration. This difference is significant
in months 2, 3 and 6 for men, and in months 1, 2 and 6 for women. Second, starting from
month 8 the control group exhibits a significantly higher exit rate from unemployment as it
approaches benefit expiration. This results in an increasing difference in the exit rate between
the two groups with a peak in months 11 and 12.11 Third, the difference in the exit rates
between the two groups remains negative also after month 12 and it starts decreasing towards
zero as they approach the benefit expiration of the treated group in month 18. A joint test for
the coefficients for the months 8 to 15 suggests that they are jointly significant at the 10% level
for men and at a 1% level for women.
These patterns suggest that both groups react to the incentives induced by the design of the
UI system with limited benefit duration. The control group exhibits higher unemployment exit
rates from the beginning of the spell with a spike close to benefit expiration around month 12,
which leads to the largest difference with the treated group. The treated group exhibits lower
exit rates all the way up to month 15 with an increasing exit rate closer to benefit expiration
in month 18, which reduces the difference in the exit rate from unemployment with the control
group to zero. We also find that the difference in the exit rate around benefit expiration in
month 12 is larger for females than males, which is consistent with the evidence provided by
Roed and Zhang (2003) for Norway. For men we find an additional significant difference at
month 18, which we do not find for women. This effect is in contrast to our expectations.
However, investigating further this difference it turns out that both groups exhibit a persistent
drop in the exit rate from unemployment, which occurs at month 18 for the treated and at
month 19 for the controls. Given these similar patterns over time, we consider the significant
11Because we define unemployment by the status in the middle of the month there could be a discrepancy of
about one month for those spells which start right after the middle of the month. For this reason the spike may
not coincide exactly with month 12.
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difference in month 18 the result of a small difference in the timing of the response between the
two groups, which does not seem to be driven by any behavioral or institutional reasons.
After both groups have exhausted their benefits we should observe no difference in their
exit rate from unemployment. For females we indeed do not find any significant differences in
the probability of finding a job after 18 months. For men we observe a lower probability of
finding a job for the months 19 to 24, which is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
However, if we conduct a joint test for the coefficients after 18 months of unemployment, this
test suggests that the differences between individuals with 12 and 18 months of eligibility for
unemployment benefits do not differ from each other significantly.
5.4.2 Post-Unemployment Outcomes
We turn now to the effect of benefit extension on post-unemployment outcomes allowing for
heterogenous effects by the length of the previous unemployment spell. As we discussed in
Section 2 there are two periods of interest. The first is the period until month 12 where both
the treated and controls receive benefits, while the control group gets closer to the time benefits
expire. The second period is the one between months 12 and 18 in which only the treated group
above age 45 receives benefits.
For men, we observe in Table 6 a negative effect of being treated on the exit rate from
employment and a positive effect on re-employment wages for jobs obtained close to the time
benefits expire for the control group (month 12) and close to the time benefits expire for the
treated group (month 18). The negative effect on the employment hazard during the first
period (months 9 to 11) suggests that even though both the treated and the control groups find
a job while still being benefit recipients, the control group obtains jobs that last for a shorter
period as they accept them closer to benefits expiration. The impact at 10 months of elapsed
unemployment duration is significant at a 10% level. The effect in the second period (months
16 to 18) is also negative suggesting a lower hazard from employment for the treated group
with a significant effect at 16 months of elapsed unemployment duration. Moreover, a joint
test indicates that the effects in months 16 to 18 are significantly different from zero at a 10%
level. For wages, there is an increasing positive difference for the treated from 3.1% in month 7
to 30% in month 9 and 17% in month 10, which are significantly different from zero. For jobs
obtained close to benefit expiration of the treated group (months 16 and 17), we also find that
wages are higher for the treated compared to the control group although these effects are not
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statistically significant.12
These findings suggest that jobs that are found while still receiving benefits last longer and
are better paid jobs compared to those found after remaining in unemployment for the same
period but with benefits expiring or without benefits. We observe, therefore, that although
both groups react to benefit expiration by exiting faster from unemployment, the treated group
with longer benefit duration obtains jobs with higher employment stability and higher wages,
while the control group faces higher employment instability and lower wages.13
For women, although we find that their unemployment exit rate reacts very strongly to
benefit expiration we do not find significant effects on post-unemployment outcomes. From
Table 6 we observe a negative treatment effect on the employment hazard for jobs found between
12 to 16 months in unemployment. However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant.
In the model without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity we get a significant difference in
the employment stability at the 10% level for females who found a job at month 16. Once we
control for dynamic selection, this coefficient decreases slightly and looses its significance. For
wages we do not find any effect of benefit extension either before or after benefit exhaustion.
5.5 Simulation of Treatment Effects
In order to evaluate the importance of being eligible for additional 6 months of unemployment
benefits on the expected unemployment and employment duration, we simulate the correspond-
ing treatment effects. The simulations are conducted for the average unemployed individual in
our sample and are based on the estimated coefficients discussed above. In every simulation we
calculate the difference in expected unemployment and employment durations conditional on
12 versus 18 months of benefit eligibility. The simulations for the model with a homogenous
treatment effect suggest that for men receiving 18 instead of 12 months of unemployment ben-
efits increases the expected unemployment duration from 11.2 to 13.5 months. However, these
estimates are based on insignificant coefficient for the treatment indicator. For females, we get
an increase in the expected unemployment duration from 8.8 to 11.3 months. If we instead
12Note that we do not measure hourly wages but daily wages in our data. Therefore, the measured impact
might be a mixture of working hours and hourly wages. Moreover, we measure the wage at the beginning of
the employment spell, which implies that the observed effect does not have to hold for the entire duration of
the post-unemployment job.
13The difference in the job match quality between the treated and the controls may be underestimated at the
time of benefit expiration because some workers in the control group whose benefits expire at month 12 may
have already obtained a job before benefit expiration (e.g. in months 9 and 10) but they could have postponed
the starting date to gain from the remaining months of UI entitlement until month 12. Boone and van Ours
(2009) suggest that the spike in the unemployment hazard rate can be partly explained by this behavior.
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simulate the same effects based on the model with heterogenous treatment effects, the results
indicate that the expected unemployment duration increases for men from 9.7 to 13.8 months.
For females, the expected unemployment duration increases from 9.6 to 12.5 months. For the
employment duration, in the specification based on an homogenous treatment effect, we do not
find evidence for an impact of receiving 6 additional months of unemployment benefits on the
expected employment duration. However, for male workers, we find some evidence for positive
treatment effects, depending on the time the job seekers find a job. Our simulations suggest
that individuals who leave unemployment for a job in month 10 stay employed for around 8.5
months if they have 2 remaining months of unemployment benefits (controls) and 17.4 months
in case of 8 remaining months of eligibility (treated). If we calculate the corresponding effects
for exits from unemployment after 16 months of unemployment the estimates indicate that the
expected employment duration increases from 17.2 to 27.5 months.
5.6 Sensitivity
We perform additional analyses to further investigate the sensitivity of our results. First, we
estimate the model for men allowing for a two dimensional mixture of normals in the error
term of the wage equation and we find very similar effects as in the model in which we assume
normality. If anything, the effects with the mixture of normals lead to slightly larger effects
(see Table A.5 in the Supplementary Appendix). For women, we could not find evidence that
the error term in the wage equation follows a two dimensional mixture of normals.
Second, we perform the analysis on the inflow sample of the unemployed without the con-
dition on having worked for 12 months in regular employment in the last year prior to entering
unemployment. The main results remain qualitatively similar, although after conditioning the
sample on past employment we obtain more precise estimates since the new benefit entitlement
leads to a uniform increase in potential benefit duration for the unemployed worker above the
age threshold from 12 to 18 months. Third, we estimate both transitions after considering exits
to inactivity (out of labor force) as right-censored spells. In the analysis so far, those who exit
the labor force were considered as continued unemployment spells since we are interested in the
time until re-employment. Our results for the unemployment hazard are robust to this sampling
strategy. By censoring spells of unemployed workers who exit the labor force we find even a
larger spike at benefit exhaustion. Similarly, for the employment hazard we find similar effects
with those of the model which we present. Fourth, we check the sensitivity of our estimates to
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the functional form assumption by estimating the model with a clog-log specification instead
of the logistic. We find that the results are not sensitive to this choice. Finally, we estimate
the model considering the exit rate out of the subsequent job instead of overall employment
duration, which includes job-to-job transitions. Again our findings are very similar for both
the unemployment and employment transitions.
6 Conclusion
Besides creating only disincentives unemployment insurance may also improve job match qual-
ity. The non-stationarity of job search behavior with limited benefit duration may not only
lead to increasing unemployment exit rates, as the unemployed approach the time of benefit
expiration, but may also affect the quality of the job match if they become less selective close to
and after benefit expiration. Exploiting a sharp discontinuity in the maximum benefit duration
in Germany, which increases from 12 to 18 months at the age of 45, we investigate the heteroge-
neous effects of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration and post-unemployment
outcomes, such as employment stability and re-unemployment wages.
The analysis addresses the two important selection issues that might invalidate our design.
The first is related to the manipulation of the running variable, for which we do not find any
evidence, and the second is related to dynamic selection issues, which we take into account by
estimating a bivariate discrete-time hazard model jointly with the wage equation allowing for
correlated unobserved heterogeneity.
Our findings for the unemployment hazard confirm previous evidence that limited benefit
duration is associated with non-stationary search behavior, which leads to a spike around benefit
expiration. The results of the main focus of the paper suggest that, due to the non-stationarity
of job search, there exist time-dependent heterogeneous effects of extended benefit duration
on job match quality. In particular, jobs which are accepted close to and after benefits have
expired are associated with a lower stability and lower wages, while those unemployed who exit
unemployment when they are still insured and could therefore reject job offers tend to find jobs
which last longer and pay higher wages. These results are found to be significant for men but
not for women.
A role of policy might be to smooth the transition rate out of unemployment to prevent
workers from being forced to obtain low quality jobs. These effects are likely to be mitigated
by the possibility to receive unemployment assistance after unemployment insurance runs out,
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which is the case in Germany. Future research should shed more light on the interaction of
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance on the unemployment exit rate and
the post-unemployment outcomes. Understanding for which subgroups of the population the
unemployment insurance job matching effect matters more is also another important question.
It is also important to emphasize that the finding of positive heterogeneous (over the duration
of unemployment) post-unemployment effects of extended benefits might be short-run effects.
This is the case because the observation period extends to only 3 years since the inflow into
unemployment such that we can only focus on the first observed wage after exit from unemploy-
ment and on the duration of the first employment spell. A natural and relevant extension of
this study is to investigate longer-term effects of benefit entitlement on employment outcomes
with the use of data that allow for a longer observation period.
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Tables
Table 1: Maximum Duration of Unemploy-
ment Benefit
Length of Benefit Age Months worked
Entitlement (in years) in last 7 years
(in months)
6 - 12
8 - 16
10 - 20
12 - 24
14 45 28
16 45 32
18 45 36
20 47 40
22 47 44
24 52 48
26 52 52
28 57 56
30 57 60
32 57 64
Source: Social Code III (§117 et seq.)
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Table 2: Number of Observations and Transitions - Below
and Above the Threshold
Men Women
Below Above Total Below Above Total
Observations 1,147 1,094 2,241 1,442 1,334 2,776
Transitions
From UE to E 857 780 1,637 1,110 977 2,087
in month 1 221 201 422 232 205 437
2 97 77 174 84 56 140
3 74 51 125 58 67 125
4 42 54 96 53 42 95
5 32 34 66 46 46 92
6 34 26 60 46 34 80
7 27 36 63 31 32 63
8 25 23 48 36 29 65
9 15 16 31 39 34 73
10 19 18 37 41 26 67
11 27 11 38 64 23 87
12 32 18 50 35 22 57
13 17 18 35 23 28 51
14 20 17 37 35 24 59
15 14 14 28 26 16 42
16 12 17 29 26 23 49
17 11 15 26 20 30 50
18 16 8 24 22 22 44
19-24 52 48 100 81 100 181
25-30 37 47 84 68 65 133
31-36 33 31 64 44 53 97
Censored 290 314 604 332 357 689
From E to UE 463 431 894 474 411 885
Censored 394 349 743 636 566 1,202
Note: The table shows the number of transitions from unemploy-
ment (UE) to employment (E) and the transitions back to unem-
ployment for those who exit unemployment and are not censored
for the two samples.
This is an inflow sample into unemployment aged 44-46 for men and
aged 43.5-46.5 for women conditional on having been employed for
36 months in the last seven years and on been working for 12 months
in regular employment in the year prior to entering unemployment.
For men the age range below the threshold of 45 is 44-44.99 and
above is 45-45.99. For women the age range is 43.5-44.99 (below)
and 45-46.5 (above).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Equality Tests by Gender
Men Women
Age Group
Below Above
p-values
Below Above
p-values
t-test1 KS-test2 t-test1 KS-test2
N 1,147 1,094 1,442 1,334
Age (in years) 44.49 45.50 0.00 0.00 44.24 45.74 0.00 0.00
Marital status
Married 0.63 0.64 0.70 1.00 0.62 0.65 0.07 0.44
Nationality
Non-German 0.09 0.09 0.71 1.00 0.06 0.05 0.33 1.00
Migration background 0.04 0.03 0.72 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.35 1.00
Children ≤ 10 years 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.90 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.81
School Degree
No degree 0.08 0.09 0.47 1.00 0.05 0.06 0.45 1.00
Low 0.56 0.54 0.53 1.00 0.47 0.52 0.01 0.05
Medium 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.92 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.97
High 0.18 0.21 0.09 0.77 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.22
Apprenticeship (yes) 0.79 0.78 0.43 1.00 0.81 0.81 0.58 1.00
University Degree (yes) 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.96 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.89
Occupational Group
Agriculture, Other 0.02 0.02 0.76 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.69 1.00
Manufacturing 0.46 0.46 0.91 1.00 0.15 0.15 0.50 1.00
Technical Occupations 0.08 0.08 0.80 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.41 1.00
Services 0.44 0.44 0.91 1.00 0.82 0.82 0.83 1.00
Labor Market History
Last daily income (in Euro) 81.44 82.00 0.72 0.34 53.22 52.63 0.63 0.53
Employment last 3 years (in months) 33.82 33.80 0.91 0.98 33.84 33.91 0.67 1.00
Employment last 4-7 years (in months) 39.41 39.44 0.95 0.99 36.15 37.31 0.03 0.00
Unemployed last 7 years (in months) 3.21 3.16 0.80 1.00 2.87 2.64 0.20 0.81
Months in employment - Year t-1 12.00 12.00 1.00 12.00 12.00 1.00
t-2 11.11 11.19 0.45 1.00 11.22 11.24 0.76 0.99
t-3 10.71 10.62 0.45 0.99 10.63 10.68 0.66 1.00
Year cohort
2001 0.26 0.26 0.84 1.00 0.26 0.28 0.14 0.79
2002 0.37 0.36 0.70 1.00 0.34 0.33 0.55 1.00
2003 0.37 0.38 0.57 1.00 0.40 0.39 0.45 1.00
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
1 p-value for t-test of mean equality in the characteristics between groups below and above the age threshold.
2 p-value for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution equality between groups below and above the age threshold.
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Figures
Figure 1: Density Test of Manipulation in the Running Variable
Men Women
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: The density test is based on McCrary(2008) and is implemented using the DCDensity.ado
routine in Stata.
Discontinuity estimates (s.e. in parentheses):
Men: .178 (.120)
Women: -.030 (.105)
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Figure 2: Empirical Unemployment Hazard Function by Treatment
Men Women
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: Individuals are an inflow sample into unemployment aged 44-46 for men and aged 43.5-46.5 for
women conditional on having been employed for 36 months in the last seven years and having worked
for 12 months in regular employment in the year prior to entering unemployment. Those who enter
unemployment below the age of 45 are eligible to 12 months of benefits, and those above 45 to 18
months of benefits.
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